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Abstract 
Moral reasoning traditionally distinguishes two types of evil: moral 
(ME) and natural (NE). The standard view is that ME is the product 
of human agency and so includes phenomena such as war, torture 
and psychological cruelty; that NE is the product of nonhuman 
agency, and so includes natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, 
disease and famine; and finally, that more complex cases are 
appropriately analysed as a combination of ME and NE. Recently, as 
a result of developments in autonomous agents in cyberspace, a new 
class of interesting and important examples of hybrid evil has come 
to light. In this paper, it is called artificial evil (AE) and a case is 
made for considering it to complement ME and NE to produce a 
more adequate taxonomy. By isolating the features that have led to 
the appearance of AE, cyberspace is characterised as a self-contained 
environment that forms the essential component in any foundation of 
the emerging field of Computer Ethics (CE). It is argued that this 
goes some way towards providing a methodological explanation of 
why cyberspace is central to so many of CE’s concerns; and it is 
shown how notions of good and evil can be formulated in 
cyberspace. Of considerable interest is how the propensity for an 
agent’s action to be morally good or evil can be determined even in 
the absence of biologically sentient participants and thus allows 
artificial agents not only to perpetrate evil (and for that matter good) 
but conversely to ‘receive’ or ‘suffer from’ it. The thesis defended is 
that the notion of entropy structure, which encapsulates human value 
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judgement concerning cyberspace in a formal mathematical 
definition, is sufficient to achieve this purpose and, moreover, that 
the concept of AE can be determined formally, by mathematical 
methods. A consequence of this approach is that the debate on 
whether CE should be considered unique, and hence developed as a 
Macroethics, may be viewed, constructively, in an alternative 
manner. The case is made that whilst CE issues are not 
uncontroversially unique, they are sufficiently novel to render 
inadequate the approach of standard Macroethics such as 
Utilitarianism and Deontologism and hence to prompt the search for 
a robust ethical theory that can deal with them successfully. The 
name Information Ethics (IE) is proposed for that theory. It is argued 
that the uniqueness of IE is justified by its being non-biologically 
biased and patient-oriented: IE is an Environmental Macroethics 
based on the concept of data entity rather than life. It follows that the 
novelty of CE issues such as AE can be appreciated properly because 
IE provides a new perspective (though not vice versa). In light of the 
discussion provided in this paper, it is concluded that Computer 
Ethics is worthy of independent study because it requires its own 
application-specific knowledge and is capable of supporting a 
methodological foundation, Information Ethics. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF EVIL 
Evil is the most comprehensive expression of ethical disapproval. As 
synonymous for extreme forms of moral wrong and the reverse of 
moral good, it is a key concept in any axiology. Of the many 
conceptual clarifications available in the literature, three need to be 
recalled here to provide the essential background of the paper (see 1-
3 below).1 
Any action, whether morally loaded or not, has the logical 
structure of a variably interactive process, which relates a set of one 
or more sources (depending on whether we are working within a 
multiagent context), the agent a, which initiates the process, with a 
set of (one or more) destinations, the patient p, which reacts to the 
process.2 To clarify the nature of a and p it is useful to borrow the 
                                                 
1 The model follows but does not pressupose knowledge of Floridi L., “Does 
Information have a Moral Worth in Itself?”, Computer Ethics: Philosophical 
Enquiry (CEPE’98), London School of Economics and Political Science, (London, 
14-15 December, 1998), http://www.wolfson.ox.ac.uk/~floridi/cepe.htm. 
2 The terms ‘agent’ and ‘patient’ are standard in Ethics and therefore will be 
maintained in this paper, however, it is essential to stress the interactive nature of 
the process and hence the fact that the patient is hardly ever a passive receiver of 
an action. A better way to qualify the patient in connection with the agent would be 
to refer to it as the ‘reagent’. 
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concept of ‘object’ from the object-oriented analysis paradigm 
(OOA).3 The agent and the patient are discrete, self-contained, 
encapsulated4 packages containing:  
· the appropriate data structures, which constitute the nature of 
the entity in question (state of the object, its unique identity, and 
attributes) 
· a collection of operations, functions or procedures (methods5), 
which are activated (invoked) by various interactions or stimuli, 
namely messages (in this essay ‘actions’ is used with this 
technical meaning) received from other objects (message passing) 
or changes within itself, and correspondingly define (implement) 
how the object behaves or reacts to them.  
In Leibnizian and more metaphysical terms, an object is a 
sufficiently permanent (a continuant) monad, a description of the 
                                                 
3 The article follows the standard terminology and the conceptual apparatus 
provided in Rumbaugh J. et al., Object-Oriented Modeling and Design. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991. 
4 Encapsulation or information hiding is the technique of keeping together data 
structures and the methods (class-implemented operations), which act on them in 
such a way that the package’s internal structure can be accessed only by means of 
the approved package routines. External aspects of an object, which are accessible 
to other objects, are thus separated from the internal implementation details of the 
object itself, which remain hidden from other objects. 
5 A method is a particular implementation of an operation, i.e. an action or 
transformation that an object performs or is subject to by a certain class. An 
operation may be implemented by more than one method. 
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ultimate primal component of all beings. The moral action itself can 
be constructed as an information process, i.e. a series of messages 
(M), initiated by an agent a, that brings about a transformation of 
states directly affecting a patient p, which may interactively respond 
to M with changes and/or other messages, depending on how M is 
interpreted by p’s methods, that is $a $p M (a, p).  
When discussing the nature of evil, the following two clarifications 
are usually accepted as standard: 
1) ‘evil’ is a second order predicate that qualifies primarily M.  
Only actions are primarily evil.6 Sources of evil (agents and their 
intentional states) are identified as evil in a derivative and often 
unclear sense: intentional states are wicked (evil) if they (can) lead to 
evil actions, and agents are overall wicked (evil) if the 
preponderance of their intentional states or actions is evil. The 
domain of intentional states or actions, however, is probably infinite, 
so the concept of ‘preponderance’ is based either on a limit in time 
and scope (a is wicked/evil between time t1 and time tn and as far as 
intentional states or actions y are concerned), or on a 
inductive/probabilistic projection (a is such that a’s future intentional 
                                                 
6 See for example Anderson S. L. , “Evil”, Journal of Value Inquiry 24 (1): 43-53, 
1990; Hampton J., “The Nature of Immorality”, Social Philosophy and Policy 7 
(1): 22-44, 1989; Kekes J., “Understanding Evil”, American Philosophical 
Quarterly 25: 13-24, 1988; Kekes J. Facing Evil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University, 1990; Kekes J., “The Reflexivity of Evil”, Social Philosophy and 
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states or actions are more likely to be evil than good). Obvious 
difficulties in both approaches reinforce the view that an agent is evil 
only derivatively; 
2) the interpretation of a ranges over the domain of all agents, 
both human and nonhuman.  
Evil actions are the result of human or nonhuman agency (e.g. 
natural disasters).7 The former is known as moral evil (ME) and it 
implies autonomy and responsibility, and hence a sufficient degree of 
information, freedom and intentionality. The latter is known as 
natural evil (NE). It is usually defined negatively, as any evil that 
arises independently of human intervention, in terms of prevention, 
defusing, or control. A third clarification, although rather common, is 
less uncontroversial: 
3) the positive sense in which an action is evil (a’s intentional 
harming) is parasitic on the privative sense in which its effect is 
evil (decrease in p’s welfare). 
Contrary to ‘responsibility’¾an agent-oriented concept that works as 
a robust theoretical ‘attractor’, in the sense that standard Macroethics 
(e.g. Consequentialism or Deontologism) tend to concentrate on it for 
                                                                                                                 
Policy 15 (1): 216-232, 1998a; Kekes J., “Evil”, in Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. London: Routledge, 1998b. 
7 Anderson (1990) argues that to be evil an action must be done consciously, 
voluntarily and wilfully, and the agent must cause some harm, or allow some harm 
to be done, to at least one other person. This definition seems too demanding, as it 
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the purpose of moral evaluations of the agent¾‘evil’ is a 
perspicuously patient-oriented concept. Actions are ontologically 
dependent on agents for their implementation (evil as cause), but are 
evaluated as evil only in view of the degree of severe and 
unnecessary harm that they may cause to their patients (evil as 
effect). Hence, whether an action is evil can be decided only on the 
basis of a clear understanding of the nature and future development 
of the interacting patient.  
Since an action is evil if and only if it harms or tends to harm 
its patient, evil, understood as the harmful effect that could be 
suffered by the interacting patient, is properly analysed only in terms 
of possible corruption, decrease, deprivation or limitation of p’s 
welfare, where the latter can be defined in terms of the object’s 
appropriate data structures and methods. This is the classic, 
‘privative’ sense in which evil is parasitic on the good and does not 
exist independently of the latter (evil as privationem boni).8 In view 
                                                                                                                 
captures only the meaning of “moral evil”. In this paper, we argue for a more 
minimalist view.  
8 Gaita R., Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception. London: Macmillan, 1991, for 
example, accepts this “Platonist view” (p. 191): “evil can be understood only in the 
light of the goodness. I shall yield to the temptation to express Platonically and say 
that evil can be understood only in the light of ‘the Good’.” However, he does not 
attempt to clarify, ultimately, how evil should be defined, but argues that (p. 192) 
“There cannot be an independent metaphysical inquiry into the ‘reality’ of good 
and evil which would underwrite or undermine the most serious of our ways of 
speaking. […] It would be better, at least in ethics, to banish the word ‘ontology’”.  
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of this further qualification, and in order to avoid any terminological 
bias, it is better to avoid using the term ‘harm’¾a zoocentric, not 
even biocentric word, which implicitly leads to the interpretation of p 
as a sentient being with a nervous system9¾in favour of ‘damage’, 
an ontocentric, more neutral term, with ‘annihilation’ as the level of 
most severe damage.  
According to the OOA approach endorsed in this paper, 
messages are processes that affect objects either positively or 
negatively. Positive messages respect or enhance p’s welfare; 
negative messages do not respect or damage p’s welfare. Evil actions 
are a subclass of negative messages, those that do not merely fail to 
respect p but (can) damage it.10 The following definition attempts to 
capture the clarifications introduced so far: 
(E) Evil action = one or more negative messages, initiated by a, that 
brings about a transformation of states that (can) damage p’s welfare 
severely and unnecessarily; or more briefly, any patient-unfriendly 
message. 
(E) excludes both victimless and anonymous evil: an action is 
(potentially) evil only if there is (could be) a damaged patient, and 
                                                 
9 Taylor R., Good and Evil - A New Direction. London: Macmillan, 1970, (p. 126): 
“Thus, the things that nourish  and give warmth and enhance life  are deemed good, 
and those that frustrate and threaten are deemed bad. […] [p. 129] [good is] that 
which satisfies or fulfils, [evil is] that which frustrates felt needs and goals” (italics 
added). 
10 For an axiological analysis see Floridi (1998). 
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there is no evil action without a damaging source, even if, in a 
multiagent and distributed context, this may be sufficiently vague or 
complex to escape clear identification (however, we shall argue 
below that this does not imply that evil cannot be gratuitous). In fact, 
because standard Macroethics tend to prioritise agent-centred 
analyses, they usually concentrate on evil actions a parte agentis, by 
presupposing the presence of an agent and qualifying the agent’s 
actions as evil, at least hypothetically or counterfactually. On the 
basis of these clarifications, it is now possible to develop five main 
theses: 
1) IE (Information Ethics) can defend a deflationary approach to 
the existence of evil 
2) ICT (information and communication technology) modifies 
the interpretation of some evils, transforming them from 
natural into moral 
3) ICT extends the class of agents, generating a new form of 
artificial evil (AE) 
4) ICT extends the class of patients, promoting a new 
understanding of evil as introduction or increase of entropy 
5) (1)-(4) contribute to clarify the uniqueness debate in 
computer ethics. 
 
NONSUBSTANTIALISM: A DEFLATIONARY APPROACH TO 
THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL  
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The classic distinction ME vs. NE is sufficiently intuitive but may 
also be misleading. Human beings may act as Natural Agents, e.g. 
unaware and healthy carries of a disease,  and natural evil may be the 
mere means of moral evil, e.g. through morally blameworthy 
negligence. But above all, the terminology may be misleading 
because it is the result of the application of first (‘moral’, ‘natural’) 
to a second order (‘evil’) predicate, which paves the way to a 
questionable hypostasization of evil and what Schmitz has aptly 
called an “entitative conception of evil”. 11 Evil is reified as if it were 
a ‘token’ transmitted by M from a to p, an oversimplified 
‘communication’ model that is implausible, since a’s messages can 
generate negative states only by interacting with p’s methods, and do 
not seem either to be evil independently of them, or to bear and 
transfer some pre-packaged, perceivable evil by themselves.  
To avoid the hypostasization of evil, a nonsubstantialist 
position (i) must defend a deflationary interpretation of evil’s 
existence without (ii) accepting the equally implausible alternative 
represented by revisionism, i.e. the negation of the existence of evil 
tout court, which may rely, for example, on an epistemological 
interpretation for its elimination (evil as appearance). This can be 
achieved by (iii) accepting the derivative and privative senses of evil 
(evil as absence of good) to clarify that ‘there is no evil’ means that 
(iv) only actions, and not objects in themselves, can be qualified as 
                                                 
11 Schmitz K. L., “Entitative and Systemic Aspects of Evil” Dialectics and 
Humanism 5: 149-161, 1978. 
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primarily evil, and that (v) what type of evil x is should not be 
decided on the basis of the nature of the agent initiating x, since ME 
and NE do not refer to some special classes of entities, which would 
be intrinsically evil, nor to some special classes of actions per se, but 
they are only shortcuts to refer to a three-place relation between 
types of agents, actions and patients’ welfare, hence to a specific, 
context-determined interpretation of the triple <a, M, p>.  
The points made in (i)-(v) seem perfectly reasonable. 
Unfortunately, especially in ancient philosophy,12 they have often 
been overinterpreted as an argument for the non-existence of evil. 
This is because nonsubstantialism has been equated with revisionism 
through an ontology of things, i.e. the assumption that either x is a 
substance, something, or x does not exist. But since evil is so 
widespread in the world, any argument that attempts to deny its 
existence is doomed to be rejected as sophistic. So revisionism is 
hardly defensible and, through the equation, the consequence has 
been that the presence of evil in the world has often been taken as 
definitive evidence against nonsubstantialism as well and, even more 
generally, as a final criticism of any theory based on (1)-(3) and (i)-
(v). It should be obvious, however, that this conclusion is not 
inevitable: nonsubstantialism is deflationary but not revisionist, and 
it is perfectly reasonable to defend the former position by rejecting 
the implicit reliance on a simple ontology of things. Actions-
                                                 
12 Especially in the Platonic tradition, see Plato, Proclus, Plotin, Augustine, but 
also Aristotle and in modern times Leibniz and Spinoza. 
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messages and objects’ states, as defined in the OOA paradigm for 
example, do not have a lower ontological status than objects 
themselves. Evil exists not absolutely, per se, but in terms of 
damaging actions and damaged objects. The fact that its existence is 
parasitic does not mean that it is fictitious. On the contrary, in an 
ontology that treats interactions, methods (operations, functions and 
procedures) and states on the same level as objects and their 
attributes, evil could not be any more real. Once an ontology of 
things is replaced by a more adequate OOA ontology, it becomes 
possible to have all the benefits of talking about evil without the 
ontological costs of a substantialist hypostasization. This is the 
approach defended by IE.13 The objection: a deflationary approach 
does not seem to do justice to the reality of evil (e.g. pain and 
suffering), can be compared to the objection of quantum physics that 
it does not seem to do justice to the reality of chairs and tables.  
 
THE EVOLUTION OF EVIL AND THE THEODICEAN 
PROBLEM 
Natural evil has been introduced as any evil that arises through no 
human action, either positive or negative: NE is whatever evil human 
beings do not initiate and cannot prevent, defuse or control.14 Since 
                                                 
13 See  Floridi (1998). 
14 It is probably useful to conceive different kinds of NE as placed on a scale, from 
the not-humanly-initiated and not-preventable earthquake (only the evil effects of it 
can be a matter of human responsibility) to the not-humanly-initiated but humanly 
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the discussion on the nature of evil has been largely monopolised by 
the theodicean debate (whether it is possible to reconcile the 
existence of God and the presence of evil),15 contemporary 
Macroethics seem to have failed to notice that this definition entails 
the possibility of a diachronic transformation of what may count as 
NE because of the increasing power of design, configuration, 
prevision and control over reality offered by science and technology 
                                                                                                                 
preventable plague to the humanly initiated and preventable mistake (human agents 
as natural causes).  
15 Most dis cussions of the nature of evil, at least in Western philosophy, have 
focused exclusively on the theoretical problem of evil as it arises within the context 
of biblical religion, treating the existence of evil as a classical objection to theism. 
A clear exa mple of this monopoly is provided by John Hick’s article “The Problem 
of Evil”, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by P. Edwards (New York: 
Macmillan, 1967), which concentrates solely upon the theodicean debate, ignoring 
any other ethical issue connected with the existence of evil. However, more 
recently things have changed, and in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
for example, we find two separate entries, one on the theodicean problem of evil, 
and one the axiological nature of evil (Kekes 1998b). Computer Ethics can help to 
reinforce this “secular” trend and a clear distinction between axiological vs. 
theological analyses of evil. On the theodicean problem, see Adams M. M. and 
Adams R. M. editors, The Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
On the axiological analysis of evil see Benn I., “Wickedness”, Ethics 95 (4): 795-
810, 1985; Kekes (1988), (1990) (1998a), (1998b); Milo R. D., Immorality. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984; Moore G. E. (1993), Principia Ethica, 
rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 256-262. Gelven M., “The 
Meanings of Evil”, Philosophy Today 27 (3/4): 200-221, 1983 provides an analysis 
of the various ways in which the word “evil” is used in English.  
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(sci-tech), including ICT. If a negative definition of NE, in terms of ¬ 
ME, is not only inevitable but also adequate, the more powerful a 
society becomes, in terms of its sci-tech, the more its members are 
responsible for what is within their power to influence. Past 
generations, when confronted by natural disasters like famine or 
flood, had little choice but to put up with their evil effects. 
Nowadays, most of the ten plagues of Egypt would be considered 
moral rather than natural evils because of human negligence.16 A 
clear sign of how much the world has changed is that people expect 
human solutions for virtually any natural evil, even when this is well 
beyond the scientific and technological capacities of present times. 
Whenever a natural disaster occurs, the first reaction has become to 
check whether anyone is responsible for an action that might have 
initiated or prevented its evil effects. Resignation is no longer an 
obvious virtue.  
The human-independent nature of NE and the power of 
science and technology, especially ICT, with its computational 
                                                 
16 It may be interesting to stress that in the Old Testament the plagues have mainly 
an ontological value, as signs of total control and power over reality, rather than 
ethical. Several times the Pharaoh’s magicians are summoned to deal with the 
extraordinary phenomena, but the point is always whether they may be able to 
achieve the same effects ‘by their secret arts’¾hence showing that there is either 
no divine intervention or equal divine support on the Egyptian side¾not whether 
they can undo or solve the difficulties caused by the specific plague. They loose 
the ‘ontic game’ when ‘the magicians tried by their secret arts to bring forth gnats, 
but they could not’. 
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capacities to forecast events, determine a peculiar phenomenon of 
constant erosion of NE in favour of an expansion of ME. If anyone 
were to die from smallpox in the future this would certainly be a 
matter of ME, no longer NE. Witchcraft in theory and sci-tech in 
practice share the responsibility of transforming NE into ME and this 
is why their masters look morally suspicious. It is an erosion that is 
inevitable, insofar as science and technology can constantly increase 
human power over nature. It may also seem unidirectional: at first, it 
may appear that the only transformation brought about by the 
evolution of sci-tech is a simplification in the nature of evil. Bunge, 
for example, analyses the moral responsibility brought about by 
technological advances, stressing how the “technologists”, i.e. the 
technology-empowered persons, will be increasingly responsible for 
their professional actions.17 However, the introduction of the concept 
of artificial evil (AE) provides a corrective to this view (see next 
section). If, for the present purpose, it is simply assumed that, at least 
in theory, all NE can become ME but not vice versa, it is obvious 
that this provides an interesting approach to the classic theodicean 
problem of evil. The theist may need to explain only the presence of 
ME despite the fact that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and all-
good, and it is known that a theodicy based on the responsibility that 
comes with freedom is more defensible,18 especially if connected 
                                                 
17 Bunge M., “Towards A Technoethics”, The Monist 60: 96-107, 1977. 
18 See Plantinga A., God, Freedom, and Evil. London: Grand Rapids, Mich: Allen 
& Unwin; William B. Eerdmans, 1975. 
   Artificial Evil - Luciano Floridi and J W Sanders      17 
with a nonsubstantialist approach to the existence of evil. In a 
utopian world, the occurrence of evil may be just a matter of human 
misbehaviour. What matters here, of course, is not to solve the 
theodicean puzzle, but to realise how ICT is contributing to make 
humanity increasingly accountable, morally speaking, for the way 
the world is. 
 
ARTIFICIAL EVIL 
More and more often, especially in advanced societies, people are 
confronted by visible and salient evils that are neither simply natural 
nor immediately moral: an innocent dies because the ambulance was 
delayed by the traffic; a computer-based monitor ‘reboots’ in the 
middle of surgery because its software is not fully compatible with 
other programs also in use, with the result that the patient is at 
increased risk during the reboot period. The examples could easily be 
multiplied. What kind of evils are these? ‘Bad luck’ and ‘technical 
incident’ are simply admissions of ignorance. Conceptually, they 
indicate the shortcomings of the ME vs. NE dichotomy. The problem 
is that the latter was formulated at a time when the primary concern 
was anthropocentric, human-agent-oriented and the main issue 
addressed was that of human and divine responsibility. Strictly 
speaking, the difference between human and natural agents is not that 
the former are not natural, but that they are autonomous, i.e. they can 
regulate themselves. So, following the standard approach, the correct 
taxonomy turns out to be a four-place scheme: forms of agency are 
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either natural or artificial (non-natural) and either autonomous or 
heteronomous (non-autonomous). Although this is not the context to 
provide a detailed analysis of an agent, the following definition is 
sufficiently adequate to clarify these four basic forms of agency: 
A) Agent = a system, situated within and a part of an 
environment, which initiates a transformation, produces an 
effect or exerts power on it over time, as contrasted with a 
system that is (at least initially) acted on or responds to it 
(patient). 
A natural agent is an agent that has its ontological basis in the normal 
constitution of reality and conforms to its course, independently of 
human beings’ intervention. Conversely, an artificial agent is an 
agent that has its ontological basis in a human constructed reality and 
depends, at least for its initial appearance, on human beings’ 
intervention. An autonomous agent is an agent that has some kind of 
control over its states and actions, senses its environment, responds 
to changes that occur in it and interacts with it, over time, in pursuit 
of its own goals, without the direct intervention of other agents. And 
a heteronomous agent is simply an agent that is not autonomous. 
Given these clarifications, the taxonomy is:   
 
Agent Natural Artificial 
Autonomous NAA AAA 
Heteronomous NHA AHA 
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NAA = natural and autonomous agent, e.g. a person, an animal, an 
angel, a god, an extraterrestrial.  
NHA = natural and heteronomous agent, e.g. a flood, an earthquake, 
a nuclear fission. 
AAA = artificial and autonomous agent, e.g. a webbot, an expert 
system, a software virus, a robot. 
AHA = artificial and heteronomous agent, e.g. traffic, inflation, 
pollution. 
ME is any evil produced by a responsible NAA; NE is any evil 
produced by NHA and by any NAA that may not be held directly 
responsible for it; AE is any evil produced by either AAA or AHA. 
The question now is: is AE always reducible to (perhaps a 
combination of) NE or ME?  
It is clear that AE is not reducible to NE because of the nature 
of the agent involved, whose existence depends on human creative 
ingenuity. But this leads precisely to the main objection against the 
presence of AE, namely that any AE is really just ME under a 
different name. We saw that Bunge may be read as supporting this 
view. Human creators are morally accountable for whatever evil may 
be caused by their artificial agents, as mere means or intermediaries 
of human activities (indirect responsibility). The objection of indirect 
responsibility is based on an analogy with the theodicean problem 
and is partly justified. In the same way as a divine creator can be 
blamed for NE, so a human creator can be blamed for AE. 
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A first reply consists in remarking that even in a theodicean 
context one still speaks of ‘natural’ not of ‘divine’ evils, thus 
indicating the nature of the agent, not of the morally responsible 
source. But this, admittedly, would be a weak retort, for it misses the 
important ethical point: if NE is ‘real’ then this causes a problem 
precisely because it is reducible to ‘divine’ evil and, mutatis 
mutandis, this could apply to the relation between AE and ME. AE 
could be just the result of carrying on morally wrong actions by other 
means. 
A better reply consists in clarifying the differences between 
the two cases. On the one hand, AE may be caused by AHA whose 
behaviour depends immediately and directly on human behaviour. In 
this case, the reduction AE = ME is reasonable. AHA are just an 
extension of their human creators, like tools, because the latter are 
both the ontological and the nomological source of the formers’ 
behaviour. Human beings can be taken to be directly accountable for 
the artificial evil involved, e.g. pollution. On the other hand, AAA, 
whose behaviour is nomologically independent of human 
intervention, may cause AE. In this case, the interpretative model is 
not God vs. created universe, but parents vs. children. Although it is 
conceivable that the evil caused by a child may be partly blamed on 
their parents, it is also true that, normally, the sins of the sons will 
not be passed on to the fathers. Indirect responsibility can only be 
forward, not backward, as it were. Things are in fact even more 
complicated than this. Recall that  
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i) evil refers primarily to actions, and  
ii) an action is evil if it causes serious and morally unjustified harm; 
according to Kekes19  
iii) if an evil action is reflexive this means that it should be taken to 
reflect adversely on the agent whose action it is and this agent would 
be held responsible for its action; 
but then, it cannot be true that 
iv) all evil actions, in the sense specified in (i)-(ii), are reflexive, in 
the sense specified in (iii).  
The negation of (iv) follows from the fact that there are many 
autonomous agents that can perform evil actions without being 
responsible for them. Kekes, however, argues the opposite and 
maintains that (i)-(iv) are consistent.20 He does so by relying on a 
questionable interpretation of “autonomy” and on the denial of a 
classic ethical principle: 
v) “actions are autonomous if their agents (a) choose to perform 
them, (b) their choices are unforced, (c) they understand the 
significance of their choices and actions, and (d) they have 
favourably evaluated the actions in comparison with other actions 
available to them. […] Actions of which any one or more of (a), (b), 
(c), or (d) is not true are nonautonomous.”21  
                                                 
19 See Kekes (1998a). 
20 See Kekes (1998a). 
21 Kekes (1998a), p. 217. 
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However, it is clear that, following (v), many human beings, no 
animal or no artificial agent could ever be autonomous, so Kekes is 
forced to argue that 
vi) in many cases, neither the evil actions nor the vices from which 
they follow are autonomous. It is nevertheless justified to hold the 
agents who perform these actions morally responsible for them; the 
widespread denial of this claim rests on the principle “ought implies 
can”; the latter, however, cannot be used to exempt agents from 
moral responsibility for their nonautonomous actions and vices. 
In fact, (v) seems to provide more a definition of freedom than a 
definition of autonomy, which is usually taken to be synonymous for 
“self-regulating” when it qualifies the nature of an agent,. Rather 
than maintaining (v) and hence being forced to abandon the “ought-
can” principle following (vi), it may be more acceptable to invert the 
process. After all, the ought-can principle may be worth salvaging, 
and the step taken in (vi) obscures the fact that people could be guilty 
of evil actions even if they are not responsible for them. Evil can be 
unintentional and this is the sense in which life can be tragic, 
Oedipus docet. If one maintains the ought-can principle and rejects 
(v) as being too strong, then (i)-(iv) needs to be modified, and since 
in this paper we agree with Kekes on (i)-(iii), (iv) must be rejected. 
Evil actions can be irreflexive or gratuitous, i.e. they can be caused 
by sources that cannot be held responsible for them. The 
modification of the definition of “autonomy”, hence the revision of 
clause (iv), allows one to consider all agents, including animals and 
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artificial agents, indirectly or derivatively evil whenever they are the 
regular source of evil actions, despite their lack of understanding, 
intent and free ability to choose to do evil, and hence moral 
responsibility.22 Note that, given our deflationary account of evil, this 
does not justify abusive treatment of evil agents. Only evil actions 
are rightly considered intrinsically worthless or even positively 
unworthy and therefore rightly disrespectable in themselves.23 If all 
this seems complicated, the reason is that we are trying to analyse a 
problem that is eminently patient-centred, i.e. the existence of evil, 
by means of a vocabulary and a cluster of concepts that are inherited 
from an agent-oriented tradition. 
Artificial ‘creatures’ can be compared to pets, agents whose 
scope of action is very wide, which can cause all imaginable evils, 
but which cannot be held morally responsible for their behaviour, 
owing to their insufficient degree of intentionality, intelligence and 
freedom. It turns out that, like in a universe without God, in 
cyberspace evil may be utterly gratuitous: there may be evil actions 
without any causing agent being morally blameable for them. Digital 
Artificial Agents are becoming sufficiently autonomous to pre-empt 
                                                 
22 Rosenfeld R., “Can Animals Be Evil?: Kekes' Character-Morality, the Hard 
Reaction to Evil, and Animals”, Between the Species 11 (1-2): 33-38, 1995; Dixon 
B. A., “Response: Evil and the Moral Agency of Animals”, Between the Species 11 
(1-2): 38-40, 1995; Rosenfeld R. (1995) “Reply”, Between the Species 11 (1-2): 
40-41, 1995. 
23 The point is fully developed in Floridi (1998). 
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the possibility that their creators may be nomologically in charge of, 
and hence morally accountable for their misbehaviour. And we are 
still dealing with a generation of agents fairly simple, predictable and 
controllable. The phenomenon of potential artificial evil will become 
even more obvious as self-produced generations of AAA evolve. Of 
course there is no ITheodicean problem because the creators, in this 
case, are fallible, only partly knowledgeable, possibly malevolent 
and may work at cross-purposes, so there is no need to explain how 
the presence of humanity may be compatible with the presence of 
AE. Unfortunately, like Platonic demiurges, fallible creators much 
less powerful than God, we may not be able to construct truly 
intelligent AAA, but we can certainly endow them with plenty of 
autonomy and interactivity, and it is in this lack of balance that the 
risk lies. It is clear that something similar to Asimov’s Laws of 
Robotics will need to be enforced for the digital environment (the 
infosphere) to be kept safe. Sci-tech transforms natural into moral 
evil but at the same time creates a new form of evil, AE. In a 
dystopian world like the one envisaged in the film directed by Andy 
and Larry Wachowski The Matrix (1999), there could be just AE and 
ME. 
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EXTENDING THE CLASS OF PATIENTS OF ARTIFICIAL EVIL 
In the previous section we have made the case for an Artificial Agent 
to be the source of an evil action. To contrast that case with the 
standard one, in which evil applies to the actions of Natural Agents, 
let us call that position Weak Artificial Evil (WAE).24 Strong 
Artificial Evil (SAE) is the position that an Artificial Agent can be 
the patient (or reagent, recall the interactive nature of the action-
relation between agent and patient) of Artificial Evil. In this section 
we revisit the previous argument and make the case for SAE. 
SAE has been prefigured by the deep ecology of Environmental 
Ethics25 in which the state of inanimate objects is taken into account 
when considering the consequences of an action (e.g. how is building 
a certain freeway going to impinge on the rock face in its path). 
However, in the form of SAE the concept can be taken further, due 
largely to the characteristic properties of cyberspace, i.e. the 
(eco)system of information acted on by digital agents. The 
information is stored as bits, but encompasses vast tracts of data in 
the form of databases, files, records and online archives. The agents 
are programs and so include operating systems and applications 
software. Cyberspace is spanned by the Internet, which provides the 
vacuous but connected space; it is populated by all that data and 
                                                 
24  Cf. weak AI, Searle John R., “Minds, Brains, and Programs”, The Behavioural 
and Brain Sciences, vol. 3. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
25 Zimmerman, M. et al. editors, Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights 
to Radical Ecology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993. 
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programs and is lent geometrical presence by the web. It is to be 
emphasised that it is not helpful, for present purposes and despite its 
name, to conceive of cyberspace only spatially: the rapid search and 
communications that are part of the web ensure that only addresses 
matter. Indeed, the features of importance to us here are: 
a) spatiality: completeness of the network (any site is available 
from any other: point-to-point connectivity); homogeneity 
(standardised addresses); robustness against failure (Cartesian 
multiplicity of links); 
b) democracy: nonhierarchical; not policed; free where possible; 
user extensible; 
c) real-time: fast synchronous access to sites and fast 
asynchronous email communication; high bandwidth; 
d) digitised: standardised digital storage and communications 
(both interpreted consistently throughout cyberspace). 
Features (a)-(d) seem to characterise interactions in cyberspace. For 
example ecommerce exploits (a), (b), (c); downloading free music 
exploits (b), (d). 
The frontier of cyberspace is the human/machine interface; 
thus we regard humans as lying outside cyberspace. In his famous 
Test,26 Turing posited a keyboard/screen interface to blanket human 
and computer. Half a century later, that very interface has become 
part of our everyday reality. Helped perhaps by the ubiquitous 
                                                 
26 Turing A. M., “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Mind 59 (236): 433-60, 
1950. 
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television and the part it has played in informing and entertaining us, 
we are coming to rely on that interface for communication (email), 
information (sites), business (ecommerce) and entertainment 
(computer games). The all-pervading nature of cyberspace seems at 
present to depend partly on the extent to which we accept its 
interface as integral to our reality; indeed we have begun to accept 
the virtual as reality. What matters is not so much moving bits 
instead of atoms—this is an outdated, communication-based 
interpretation of the information society that owes too much to mass-
media sociology—as the far more radical fact that the very essence 
and fabric of reality is changing. The information society is better 
seen as a neo-manufacturing society in which raw materials and 
energy have been superseded by the new digital gold. Not just 
communication and transactions then, but the creation, design and 
management of information are the keys to its proper understanding.  
Cyberspace supports a variety of agents: from routine service 
software (like communications protocols) through less routine 
applications packages (like cybersitters, webbots) to applets 
downloadable from remote web sites. The latter highlight a shift in 
the burden of responsibility of software engineers. Formerly, (and 
still, of course, in the bulk of situations today) there was a contract 
between software engineer and user: the software engineer was 
responsible for the performance of the software, defensible if 
necessary at law. That model suited the context in which computers, 
or local-area networks, were isolated from others, except by physical 
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media (disks, CDROMs, etc). In the new model, promoted by 
cyberspace, there is no ‘point of sale’, since a program may be 
downloaded at one of a sequence of mouse clicks, with no clear 
responsibility or even specification attending its acquisition. So 
seamless is the interface that the user may not even be aware that a 
program has been downloaded and executed locally. 
The autonomy (and hence seamlessness) of that interaction is 
further reinforced by Artificial Agents which employ randomisation 
in making decisions (the giver of a coin can hardly be held 
responsible for decisions made on the basis of tossing it, even if the 
coin is sold as a binary-decision-making mechanism); and Artificial 
Agents which are able to adapt their behaviour on the basis of 
experience (in only an indirect sense were the programmers of Deep 
Blue responsible for its win, since it ‘learnt’ by being exposed to 
volumes of games;27 thus its programmers were quite unable to 
explain, in any of the terms of chess parlance, how Deep Blue 
played).28 Given the presence of such agents, and the tendency 
towards further autonomy, the only reasonable view seems to be that 
misfortune resulting from such programs is evil for which neither 
                                                 
27  King D. Kasparov v. Deeper Blue. London: B T Batsford, Ltd, 1997. 
28 Mitchell T. M, Machine Learning. McGraw Hill, 1997 provides the following 
examples of adaptive software: ‘data-mining programs that learn to detect 
fraudulent credit-card transactions, to information-filtering programs that learn 
users’ reading preferences, to autonomous vehicles that learn to drive on public 
highways.’ 
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human nor nature is directly responsible. Such a situation does not 
appear in the physical world inhabited by mechanical artifacts 
because their physical presence renders such machines, and their 
behaviour, traceable to their origins. Were they autonomous and able 
to transform and adapt, in the way programs can, such machines 
would provide an analogous example of AE; but so far they seem to 
be no more than instruments of science fiction.29 
Cyberspace and its interface support actions that may 
originate from humans (email from a colleague) or Artificial Agents 
(messages from a word processor or directives from a webbot). The 
claim is not that current software has passed the Turing Test. It is 
simply that, with the types of software mentioned above, there is 
scope for evil that lies beyond the responsibility of human beings or 
nature. 
Our region of cyberspace is in general changed as a result of 
the autonomous execution of Artificial Agents: decisions are 
delegated to routine procedures, data are altered, settings changed 
                                                 
29 For mechanisms that adapt to terrain see http://www.parc.xerox.com/modrobots. 
For statistically adaptive reconfigurable logic arrays, see 
http://jisp.cs.nyu.edu/RWC/rwcp/activities/achievements/AD/nec/eng/home-
e.html. In fiction adaptive robots occur in the work of James P Hogan (e.g. `Two 
faces of Tomorrow’ (1979) in which a semi-intelligent system controls a 
production line as part of a space station and, under pressure of attack, designs and 
produces different kinds of robot) and the popular film Terminator 2 (in which the 
shape-shifting cyborg, T-1000 is sent back from the future to kill John Connor 
before he can grow up to lead the resistance). 
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and programs subsequently behave differently. Artificial Patients in 
cyberspace thus ‘respond’ or ‘react’, often interactively, to actions. 
Some actions seem benign: the easter eggs cuckoo-ed inside 
Macintosh and Palm software30 constitute such examples. It seems 
equally clear that certain actions on Artificial Patients are evil: 
viruses and the action of certain webbots, for example. But the case 
for an Artificial Agent being the recipient of evil (and in particular, 
Artificial Evil) depends on our being able to make the case for 
determining when the preponderance of consequences¾as far as the 
patient goes¾are bad. For that, we rely on the digital nature of 
cyberspace and employ the notion of entropy.31  
First, we observe that an action in cyberspace is not 
uncontroversially bad or good; some value judgement is required to 
evaluate its moral worth. Thus it is a matter of judgement and context 
whether we regard as good or bad the effect of running a program: it 
might delete useful data (as might a virus) and so be judged bad, or it 
might perform useful garbage collection by removing inaccessible 
data, and so be judged good. In a previous article,32 we have made 
the case for entropy structures as a means of evaluating an action in 
                                                 
30  Pogue D., Palm Pilot: The Ultimate Guide, 2nd ed. O’Reilly Press, 1999. 
31 What follows summarises an argument begun in Floridi (1998) and developed in 
Floridi L. and Sanders J., “Entropy as Evil in Information Ethics”, in Floridi L. 
editor, Etica & Politica, special issue on Computer Ethics, 2, 1999b 
http://www.univ.trieste.it/~dipfilo/ etica_e_politica/1999_2/homepage.html. 
32 Floridi and Sanders (1999). 
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cyberspace that combines judgements about desirable features of 
cyberspace with its discrete, and hence unambiguously definable, 
nature. An entropy structure is an ordering on cyberspace defined to 
capture the notion of a bad state change. The state-after is worse than 
the state-before. The state S of cyberspace consists of the values of 
all data, including software. A bad action changes state S1 into S2, 
where S2 is greater in the entropy ordering; a benign action decreases 
the entropy ordering. The effect of any action is characterised, as a 
state transformer, mathematically by the relationship (a predicate) 
between the state-before, the input and output, and the state-after (in 
the example above, state is partitioned into used and unused store 
and the action converts some used store into unused store). It is then 
a matter of proof or counterexample whether an action is good (none 
of its transitions yields an after-state which is greater in the entropy 
ordering than its before-state) or evil (there is a before-state and a 
transition in which the after-state is greater in the entropy ordering). 
Furthermore, the formalism can be used to determine when one 
action is more, or less, evil than another. The increase of entropy has 
been chosen, of course, to match the standard view from 
thermodynamics. However, in that setting no judgement is required 
since any increase, leading as it does to an increase in global 
randomness, is deemed bad.33 In summary, it is reasonable to permit 
an Artificial Agent to be the patient of evil and thus to have a moral 
                                                 
33 For formal definitions, examples and further discussion see Floridi and Sanders 
(1999). 
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standing. We conclude that the interpretation of the relational and 
interactive structure, symbolised by the triple <agent, action, 
patient>, is one of the central component of any Information Ethics.  
 
THE UNIQUENESS DEBATE 
The informative ‘uniqueness’ debate34 has aimed to determine 
whether the issues confronting CE are unique and hence whether, as 
a result, CE should be developed as an independent Macroethics. The 
debate arises from two different interpretations of the policy vacuum 
problem,35 one more conservative, the other more radical.  
The conservative interpretation suggests that, in order to cope 
with the policy vacuum, standard Macroethics, like 
Consequentialism or Deontologism, are sufficient. They should be 
adapted, enriched and extended, but they have the conceptual 
resources to deal with CE questions successfully. Coherently, the 
conservative approach maintains that: 
Extending the idea that computer technology creates new possibilities, in a seminal 
article, Moor [1985] suggested that we think of the ethical questions surrounding 
computer and information technology as policy vacuums. Computer and 
                                                 
34 Johnson D. G., “Sorting Out the Uniqueness of Computer-Ethical Issues”, in 
Floridi L. editor, Etica & Politica, special issue on Computer Ethics, 2, 1999b 
http://www.univ.trieste.it/~dipfilo/ etica_e_politica/1999_2/homepage.html; Maner 
W. , “Is Computer Ethics Unique?”, in Floridi L. editor, Etica & Politica, special 
issue on Computer Ethics, 2, 1999b http://www.univ.trieste.it/~dipfilo/ 
etica_e_politica/1999_2/homepage.html. 
35 Moor J. H., “What is Computer Ethics?” Metaphilosophy 16 (4): 266-275, 1985. 
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information technology creates innumerable opportunities. This means that we are 
confronted with choices about whether and how to pursue these opportunities, and 
we find a vacuum of policies on how to make these choices. […] I propose that we 
think of the ethical issues surrounding computer and information technology as 
new species of traditional moral issues. On this account the idea is that computer-
ethical issues can be classified into traditional ethical categories. They always 
involve familiar moral ideas such as personal privacy, harm, taking responsibility 
for the consequences of one’s action, putting people at ris k, and so on. On the other 
hand, the presence of computer technology often means that the issues arise with a 
new twist, a new feature, a new possibility. The new feature makes it difficult to 
draw on traditional moral concepts and norms. […]  The genus-species account 
emphasizes the idea that the ethical issues surrounding computer technology are 
first and foremost ethical. This is the best way to understand computer-ethical 
issues because ethical issues are always about human beings.36  
 
According to the radical interpretation, the policy vacuum problem 
indicates that CE deals with absolutely unique issues, in need of a 
completely new approach. It argues that 
[Computer Ethics] must exist as a field worthy of study in its own right and not 
because it can provide a useful means to certain socially noble ends. To exist and 
to endure as a separate field, there must be a unique domain for computer ethics 
distinct from the domain for moral education, distinct even from the domains of 
other kinds of professional and applied ethics. Like James Moor, I believe 
computers are special technology and raise special ethical issues, hence that 
computer ethics deserves special status.37 
 
                                                 
36 Johnson (1999). 
37 Maner (1999). 
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The conservative approach is faced by at least three problems. It does 
not clarify which Macroethics should be adopted to deal with CE 
problems. It does not make explicit whether CE problems could be 
used as test experiments to evaluate specific Macroethics. And it runs 
the risk of missing what is intrinsically new in CE, not at the level of 
problems and concepts, but at the level of contribution to the ethical 
discourse. A mere extension of standard Macroethics would not 
enable us to uncover the nature of AE, for example. 
The radical approach is equally faced by at least three 
problems. It seems unable to show the absolute uniqueness of CE 
issues. None of the cases provided by Maner is uncontroversially 
unique, for example. This is to be expected: it would be surprising if 
any significant moral issue were to belong to only one limited 
conceptual region, without interacting with the rest of the ethical 
context. Second, even if unique ethical issues in CE were available, 
this would not mean that their “uniqueness” would be simply 
inherited by the discipline that studies them, as it were. Unique 
problems may still require only some evolutionary adaptation of old 
solutions, and unique disciplines are not necessarily so because they 
are involved with unique subjects, for they may share their subjects 
with other disciplines, the difference resting, for example, in their 
methodologies, aims and approaches. Third, a radical approach runs 
the risk of isolating CE from the more general ethical discourse. This 
would mean missing the opportunity to enrich our choice of 
Macroethical approaches. 
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By introducing the analysis of AE as a case-study, the view 
presented in this paper suggests that there may be a third approach to 
the policy vacuum. We have tried to show that the analysis of AE has 
been made possible by an approach that is not conservative, but that 
does not consider CE unique in a radical sense either. Although it is 
more manifest in cyberspace and readily studied there, AE is not 
necessarily unique to CE. It may be apparent, for example, in 
Environmental Ethics and in the world of physical automata. Yet, 
because of its novelty and important position in ethics, AE seems to 
demand further study in its own right. Because it embraces many of 
the current difficulties of CE, it should be studied in, amongst other 
places, an applied setting where appropriate policy decisions can be 
analysed. This approach to the nature of CE interprets the policy 
vacuum problem as a signal that the monopoly exercised by standard 
Macroethics is unjustified, and that the family of ethical theories can 
be enriched by including an object-oriented approach that is not 
biologically biased. With their novelty, CE problems like AE do not 
strictly force, but certainly encourage us to modify the perspective 
from which we look at the field of ethics. Yet the novelty of CE 
problems is not so dramatic as to require the development of an 
utterly new, separate and unrelated discipline. CE has its own 
methodological foundation, Information Ethics38 and so it is able to 
support autonomous theoretical analyses. And it contains domain-
                                                 
38 Floridi L., Information Ethics: On the Philosophical Foundation of Computer 
Ethics, Ethics and Information Technology 1 (1): 37-56, 1999a. 
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specific issues, including pressing practical problems, which can be 
used to ‘test’ its methodology. The conclusion to be drawn from this 
case-study is that rather than allowing standard Macroethics to 
“occupy” the territory of CE or isolating CE in an impossibly 
autonomous and independent position, CE should be promoted to the 
level of another Macroethics. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
a = agent 
AAA = artificial and autonomous agent 
AE = artificial evil 
AHA = artificial and heteronomous agent 
CE = computer ethics 
IE = information ethics 
ICT = information and communication technology 
M = message 
ME = moral evil 
NAA = natural and autonomous agent 
NE = natural evil 
NHA = natural and heteronomous agent 
OOA = object-oriented analysis  
p = patient 
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